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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 14-4147 
_______________ 
 
STEPHEN CELENTO, 
 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY 
 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 2-13-cv-00269) 
District Judge: Hon. Alan N. Bloch 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 18, 2015 
 
Before: AMBRO, FUENTES, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: August 26, 2015) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
______________  
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge:  
 While working for a river towing company, Stephen Celento sustained serious 
injuries to his lungs and brain when he fell off a barge in 2004.  Celento has not worked 
since the accident.  In 2009, he filed for disability benefits under Subchapter II of the 
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.  After the claim was initially denied, Celento 
requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).  The following facts 
were presented to the ALJ. 
 Celento testified about his physical and mental condition in the years since the 
accident.  Because of sharp pain in his knees, he can walk only about three blocks at a 
time.  He can sit for an hour or more if he has room to move his legs, otherwise he needs 
to stand up every fifteen to twenty minutes.  He can stand for about a half-hour.  Celento 
has limited mobility with his arms and shoulders, and can lift only light weights.  He has 
three titanium plates in his chest and lost forty-two percent of his lung capacity.  Celento 
said that being around people makes him very nervous and he has concentration 
problems. 
 The ALJ heard testimony and reviewed evidence about Celento’s daily life.  For 
example, he is able to drive, use public transportation, and go shopping.  He volunteers at 
the local Chamber of Commerce.  He is able to perform household chores such as 
vacuuming, dusting, and washing laundry.  And his hobbies include reading, using his 
computer, photography, and knitting.   
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 Celento’s extensive medical records were also submitted into evidence.  In 2005, 
he was diagnosed with restrictive lung disease, but his doctor encouraged him to maintain 
a regular level of activity, including exercise.  In 2007, another doctor found that 
Celento’s breathing sounds, cardiovascular system, and back were normal.  After 
complaining about shingles in 2009, another doctor found that Celento’s physical 
condition was generally normal.  The next year, Celento informed one of his doctors that 
he “[f]eels unable to work [due] to pain in chest and back left shoulder whether sitting or 
moving, [and] gets [shortness of breath] with minimal exertion.”  App. 564.  The doctor 
noted that Celento had restrictive lung disease and localized pain, but otherwise found his 
physical condition largely normal. 
 Several doctors have also assessed Celento’s mental health over the years.  In the 
months following the accident, one doctor diagnosed Celento with acute stress disorder 
and post-traumatic stress disorder.  Celento informed another doctor that he started self-
medicating with alcohol to ease the chronic pain in his shoulder and chest.  That doctor 
diagnosed him with social phobia, alcohol dependence, and avoidant personality disorder.  
However, he believed Celento was “fully oriented,” had “no difficulty with short term 
memory,” had “no problems with concentration,” and his “[l]anguage and motor skills are 
intact”—“[o]verall, minimal cognitive impairment is noted.”  App. 525. 
 At the hearing, the ALJ asked a vocational expert whether there are jobs in the 
economy for individuals with limitations similar to Celento’s (e.g., lifting only up to ten 
pounds at time and standing only for two hours a day).  The vocational expert identified 
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various unskilled sedentary jobs, including a ticket checker, surveillance systems monitor, 
or inspector.   
 Based on this record, the ALJ determined that, when not drinking, Celento is not 
disabled.  Celento appealed the ALJ’s decision to the District Court, which affirmed.  On 
appeal to this Court, Celento raises one issue:  he argues that the ALJ gave “undue 
consideration to his sporadic physical activities and fail[ed] to consider the proposition 
that one’s ability to put aside pain for brief periods of time while performing sporadic 
household activities does not mean that he can engage in similar activities for eight hour 
stretches, five days a week.”  Celento Br. at 2. 
 As Celento’s challenge goes to the ALJ’s factual findings, our review is highly 
deferential.  If the findings are supported by substantial evidence, they “shall be 
conclusive.”  42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000).  
Substantial evidence means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion.”  Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  We have no trouble concluding that the ALJ’s 
decision to deny benefits was supported by the record.  The ALJ considered Celento’s 
physical activities as one relevant consideration among many others in its analysis.  
Although Celento offered testimony of his pain, social anxiety, and inability to 
concentrate, his daily activities and much of the medical evidence tended to undermine 
his position.  For example, Celento drives, volunteers, does work around the house, and 
has several hobbies.  These activities require at least some physical exertion and mental 
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concentration.  Moreover, much of the medical evidence indicated that, although he had 
restrictive lung disease, his physical condition was generally normal.  In addition, a 
vocational expert testified that someone with Celento’s limitations could obtain an 
unskilled sedentary job.  The ALJ took all this evidence into account, made credibility 
determinations, and reasonably concluded that, when not abusing alcohol, Celento is not 
disabled. 
 For these reasons, we affirm the District Court’s order. 
